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Abstract—Distributed systems and networks have been
adopted by telecommunications, remote educations, businesses,
armies and governments. A widely applied technique for dis-
tributed systems and networks is the single sign-on (SSO) which
enables a user to use a unitary secure credential (or token) to
access multiple computers and systems where he/she has access
permissions. However, most existing SSO schemes have not been
formally proved to satisfy credential privacy and soundness of
credential based authentication. To overcome this drawback,
we formalise the security model of single sign-on scheme with
authenticated key exchange. Specially, we point out the difference
between soundness and credential privacy, and deﬁne them
together in one deﬁnition. Also, we propose a provably secure
single sign-on authentication scheme, which satisﬁes soundness,
preserves credential privacy, meets user anonymity, and supports
session key exchange. The proposed scheme is very efﬁcient
so that it suits for mobile devices in distributed systems and
networks.
Index Terms—Single sign-on, Distributed systems and net-
works, Soundness, Authentication, Information security.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the wide spreading of distributed computer networks,
various network services have gained importance and popu-
larity in recent few years [1][2]. Consequently, user authen-
tication [3] has been widely used in distributed computer
networks to identify a legal user who requires accessing net-
work services. To prevent bogus servers, mutual authentication
should be considered, and also, a session key establishment is
normally required. In addition, user privacy may be desired in
distributed computing environments since the information ex-
changed might be abused by some organizations for marketing
purposes [4]. However, designing efﬁcient and secure mutual
authentication protocols is challenging in computer networks.
Moreover, with the increasing usage of network services, a
user may need to maintain more and more ID/password pairs
for accessing different distributed service providers, which
impose a burden on users and service providers as well as
the communication overhead of computer networks. Single
sign-on (SSO) mechanism [5] provides a good remedy to this
problem, as it allows a user with a single credential to access
multiple service providers. Intuitively, there are three basic
security requirements for SSO schemes, namely completeness,
soundness and credential privacy [16], [6]. However, to the
best of our knowledge soundness has not been formally studied
yet and how to preserve both soundness and credential privacy
is still a challenge [6].
In 2000, Lee and Chang [7] ﬁrst proposed an SSO scheme
with user anonymity. Later, Wu and Hsu [8] pointed out
that Lee-Chang scheme suffers from masquerading attack and
identity disclosure attack. Meanwhile, Yang et al. [9] showed
that Wu-Hsu scheme can not preserve credential privacy
either since a malicious service provider can recover users’
credentials, and then proposed an improvement to overcome
this limitation. In 2006, however, Mangipudi and Katti [10]
pointed out that Yang et al.’s scheme is insecure against DoS
(Deniable of Service) attack and presented a new scheme.
In 2009, Hsu and Chuang [11] demonstrated that both Yang
et al. and Mangipudi-Katti schemes have not provided user
anonymity since their schemes are vulnerable to identity
disclosure attacks. To prevent such attacks, Hsu and Chuang
proposed an RSA-based user identiﬁcation scheme.
Recently, Chang and Lee [12] pointed out that Hsu-Chuang
scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks and the scheme
requires additional time-synchronized mechanisms which has
unstable latency in distributed networks. Then, they proposed a
user anonymity preserving improvement with high efﬁciency.
The scheme uses random nonce to replace additional time-
synchronized mechanism, does not need PKI (Public key
infrastructure) for users, and suits for mobile device users.
However, the security analysis [6] shows that Chang-Lee
scheme fails to provide proper user authentication and to
preserve credential privacy since the knowledge proof of
user authentication guarantees neither soundness nor credential
privacy.
As promoted in [6], it is worthy to overcome the ﬂaws
in Chang-Lee scheme to obtain an efﬁcient and provably
secure scheme for mobile device users in distributed systems
and networks. Moreover, the soundness of credential based
authentication should be formalised and the credential privacy
should be preserved. Motivated to solve these issues, in this
paper we ﬁrst specify a formal model for SSO with a uniﬁed
deﬁnition to formally specify soundness and credential privacy
(Section II). Then, after reviewing Chang-Lee SSO scheme
in Section III and Schnorr signature [13] in Section IV, we
improve Chang-Lee scheme by exploiting Schnorr signature
in Section V due to its simplicity and unforgeability [14],
[15], while keep Chang-Lee’s session key establishment part
unchanged. The security of the proposed protocol is discussed
in Section VI. Finally, section VII concludes this paper.
II. FORMAL MODEL
In this section we present a formal model to deﬁne authen-
ticated key exchange single sign-on (AKESSO) scheme and
its security requirements. Specially, we list the components
(e.g. syntax) of AKESSO, deﬁne correctness, describe an ad-
versary model, and formally specify three security properties,
including secure credential based user authentication, secure
credential based service provider authentication, and session
key security.
Deﬁnition 1. An authenticated key exchange single sign-
on (AKESSO) scheme comprises a trusted credential provider
TCP , a group of service providers P and a group of users U .
It consists of eight algorithms and one protocol: initialization
algorithm Init(·), identity generation algorithm IdGen(·),
credential generation algorithm CGen(·), credential veriﬁ-
cation algorithm CV er(·), user proof generation algorithm
UPGen(·), user proof veriﬁcation algorithm UPV er(·), ser-
vice provider proof generation algorithm SPPGen(·), and
service provider proof veriﬁcation algorithm SPPV er(·), and
key exchange protocol
∏
.
1) Init(λ): Taking security parameter λ0 (or λ1) as input,
outputs the public/private key pair (PK,SK) for TCP
(or (PKj , SKj) for Pj ∈ P ).
2) IdGen(RIi): Taking registration information RIi as
input, outputs an unique identity IDi for a user Ui ∈ U .
3) CGen(IDi, SK): Taking an identity IDi and TCP ’s
private key SK as input, outputs a credential Ci for
user Ui.
4) CV er(Ci, IDi, PK): Taking credential Ci, an identity
IDi, and TCP ’s public key PK as input, outputs
“1” or “0” for accepting or rejecting credential Ci
respectively.
5) UPGen(Ci, IDi, PK,M): Taking a credential Ci, an
identity IDi, TCP ’s public key PK and a temporal
message M generated in a session as input, outputs a
user proof upi showing user Ui’s knowledge of creden-
tial Ci.
6) UPV er(upi, IDi, PK,M): Taking a user proof upi, an
identity IDi, TCP ’s public key PK, and a temporal
message M generated in a session as input, outputs
“1” or “0” for accepting or rejecting upi as a valid
credential proof w.r.t. identity IDi respectively.
7) SPPGen(SKj ,M ′): Taking service provider Pj’s pri-
vate key SKj and a temporal message M ′ generated in
a session as input, outputs a service provider proof sppj
showing Pj’s knowledge of SKj .
8) SPPV er(sppj , PKj ,M ′): Taking a service provider
proof sppj , Pj’s public key PKj , and a temporal
message M ′ generated in a session as input, outputs
“1” or “0” for accepting or rejecting sppj as a valid
service provider proof w.r.t. public key PKj respectively.
9)
∏
: This is a key exchange protocol run by a user
Ui with private input Ci and a service provider Pj
with private input SKj . After the completion of each
protocol instance, Ui will output a session key Kij if
he/she accepts Pj . Similarly, after the completion of
each protocol instance Pj will output a session key Kji
if it accepts Ui. (Ideally, Kij and Kji are expected to
be the same value.)
Remark 1. The above deﬁnition focuses on public key based
AKESSO with non-interactive proofs. It could be extended to
support interactive proofs, where spi and sspj are generated
by interactive protocols run by user Ui and service provider
Pj . However, deﬁning symmetric key based AKESSO will be
another story, which is out the scope of this paper.
Remark 2. Compared to Han et al.’s formal model given in
[16], we require key exchange in AKESSO, and each user does
not need to hold a public/private key pair. However, in Han et
al.’s deﬁnition TCP (called IdP in their paper) is less trusted
as it will not be able to impersonate any user: Each user
will run a zero knowledge protocol to show that he/she knows
the private key corresponding to the public key embedded in
his/her credential.
Before formally deﬁning security properties, we naturally
require an AKESSO should be correct. Namely, a credential
Ci generated by the trusted credential provider TCP will be
valid, a user proof upi issued properly by user ui who holds a
valid credential Ci will be accepted by a service provider Pj
according to UPV er algorithm, a service provider proof sppj
issued properly by Pj will be accepted by user Ui according
to SPPV er algorithm, and Ui and Pj will accept each other
and output the same session key if they honestly run the
key exchange protocol
∏
. Formally, we deﬁne correctness as
below.
Deﬁnition 2. (Correctness) An AKESSO scheme is called
correct if it satisﬁes all the following conditions:
1) For any RIi and any key pair (PK,SK), if IDi ←
IdGen(RIi) and Ci ← CGen(IDi, SK), then
CV er(Ci, IDi, PK) = 1.
2) For any IDi, any key pair (PK,SK) and any
M , if Ci ← CGen(IDi, SK) and upi ←
UPGen(Ci, IDi, PK,M), then UPV er(upi, IDi,
PK,M) = 1.
3) For any key pair (PKj , SKj) and any
M ′, if sppj ← SPPGen(SKj ,M ′), then
SPPV er(sppj , PKj ,M
′) = 1.
4) For any user Ui with valid credential Ci and service
provider Pj with private key SKj , if both of them run
the key exchange protocol
∏
honestly, then they will
accept each other and output the same session key, i.e.,
Kij = Kji.
Informally, an AKESSO scheme is secure if all the desired
functionalities given in the above deﬁnition can be carried
out only by the proper entities, i.e., not by attackers who
are allowed to access all possible resources in a rigorously
speciﬁed adversary model. In fact, we shall deﬁne security of
SSO authentication which corresponds to items 1) to 3), and
session key privacy which corresponds to item 4).
To further deﬁne these security properties, we specify
the adversary model as follows: Let
∏
TCP be the trusted
authority oracle with its key pair (SK,PK),
∏i
U,P be the
user oracle simulating a set of all registered users, interacting
with the service provider oracle in session i, and
∏j
P,U be the
service provider oracle simulating a set of all registered service
providers, interacting with the user oracle in the session j. A
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can ask the
following oracle queries.
1) O1: Register(
∏
, U)— Upon receiving this query, the∏
TCP will run IdGen(RIAi) and CGen(IDAi , SK)
algorithms, and output a new user identity IDAi with
corresponding credential CAi to A who can verify the
credential by running CV er(·).
2) O2: Register(
∏
, P )— Upon receiving this query, the
system will run Init(λ1) and output PAj ’s private/public
key pair (SKAj , PKAj ) together with identity SIDAj
to A.
3) O3: Execute(Ui, Pj)— Upon receiving this query,∏i
U,P and
∏j
P,U will execute protocol as Ui and Pj in∏
, respectively. The exchanged messages between them
will be recorded and sent to A. Here, we require that
both Ui’s credential and Pj’s private key are not been
corrupted by A via O1 and O2 oracles.
4) O4: Send(Ui,m, f)—This query sends the message m
as message ﬂow f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} to the user oracle∏i
U,P which simulates a user Ui, and then, the oracle
computes message honestly in
∏
, and sends responses
back to A, where n is the total number of messages
transmitted in protocol
∏
. If a user is the protocol
initiator by default, A can also start a new session by
asking Send(Ui, ∅, 0), where ∅ denotes an empty set.
5) O5: Send(Pj ,m, f)—This query sends the message m
as message ﬂow f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} to the user oracle∏i
P,U which simulates a service provider Pj , and then,
the oracle computes message honestly in
∏
, and sends
responses back to A. If a service provider is the protocol
initiator by default, A can also start a new session by
asking Send(Pj , ∅, 0).
6) O6: Reveal(
∏
, i)—This query models the leakage of
session key in session i. This query only can be asked
when a session key has been shared between a service
provider and a user in session i.
Remark 3. O3 simulates the real environment for a passive
attacker A who can eavesdrop all messages exchanged be-
tween Ui and Pj when executing protocol
∏
. If A knows
Ui’s credential Ci and Pj’s private key SKj , oracle O3 is
not necessary as A can run protocol
∏
by itself on behalf of
them. If A knows one of these two secrets but not both, A can
run protocol
∏
with Ui (Pj) whose secret is not released via
executing oracle O4 (O5).
Remark 4. O4 simulates the real environment for an active
attacker A who may obtain a service provider Pj’s private key
SKj , send message m as message ﬂow f ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n} to
a target user Ui and then get the corresponding response.
To answer this oracle, Ui will generate his/her response
according to the speciﬁcation of protocol
∏
and sends it to
A. Notes that if Ui did not receive all necessary previous
messages that match this message with message ﬂow f , this
oracle request will be rejected, since it is meaningless in
the view point of Ui. Actually, O4 also provides adversary
A oracle access on algorithm UPGen(·) since ∏iU,P will
run UPGen(·) somehow in executing ∏. In our construction,
UPGen(·) is Schnorr signature generation algorithm. In this
case, on the one hand, oracle O4 may be not stronger than the
signing oracle in Game-UFCMA reviewed in section IV, since
the temporal message M , one input of algorithm UPGen(·),
may be jointly decided by Ui and A (playing the role of one
Pj), rather than just by A. So, it may be hard for A to get Ui’s
user proof for any arbitrary message M . On the other hand,
adversary A may be not weaker than the forger in Game-
UFCMA since besides O4 we also offer other oracle queries,
which may increase A’s ability. We omit a similar remark
which applies to O5.
To formally deﬁne the soundness and credential privacy,
we ﬁrst discuss the difference between soundness and cre-
dential privacy since the majority of existing schemes only
consider the credential privacy. The credential privacy requires
unforgeability and irrecoverableness. The former guarantees
that any PPT adversary A has only a negligible probability
for successfully forging a valid credential Ct of a target user
Ut in the credential generation phase, while the latter requires
that in user authentication phase, any A can only recover Ct
with a negligible probability. Soundness is also critical in the
user authentication phase as it ensures that any A without a
valid credential can only generate a user proof up that passes
through user authentication with a negligible probability. The
existing studies [16], [12] only focus on if a valid credential
can be forged or recovered by attackers, but do not consider if
a valid credential is deﬁnitely necessary for generating a valid
user proof. We shall deﬁne these three properties as a single
deﬁnition (but one for users and one for service providers).
Let AO denotes an adversary A who has access to all oracle
queries in O = {Oi|i = 1, 2, · · · , 6} in adversary model;
let the credential holder Ui with identity IDi and credential
Ci, and the service provider Pj with identity SIDj and key
pair (SKj , PKj) are two polynomial-time Turing machines.
Let Ui and Pj interact with each other, and place A between
Ui and Pj .  denotes a negligible function. We deﬁne secure
credential based user authentication as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. (Secure credential based user authentication
(SCUA)) An AKESSO scheme achieves secure credential
based user authentication, if any PPT adversary A has a
negligible advantage AdvSCUA(AO) for creating a valid user
proof without holding the corresponding credential. Formally,
for any PPT A, AdvSCUA(AO)

= Pr[(IDt, upt,M) ←
AO|UPV er(upt, IDt, PK,M) = 1] ≤  with the following
restrictions:
• A has not obtained the credential Ct corresponding to
IDt via O1 - Register(
∏
, U) oracle; and
• A has not obtained any valid user proof up′t for message
M by asking any oracle in O, in particular O3 and O4.
Similarly, the deﬁnition of secure service provider authen-
tication is given as below:
Deﬁnition 4. (Secure service provider authentication
(SSPA)) An AKESSO scheme achieves secure ser-
vice provider authentication, if any PPT adversary A
has a negligible advantage AdvSSPA(AO) for forging a
valid service provider proof without holding the corre-
sponding service provider’s private key . Formally, for
any PPT A, AdvSSPA(AO)

= Pr[(PKt,M
′, sppt) ←
AO|SPPV er(PKt,M ′, sppt) = 1] ≤  with the following
restrictions:
• A has not obtained the private key SKt corresponding
to SIDt via O2 - Register(
∏
, P ) oracle;
• A has not obtained any valid service provider proof sppt
for message M ′ by asking any oracle in O, in particular
O3 and O5.
Here, we review the freshness and test query Test(
∏
, i)
for deﬁning session key security [17]. An adversary can get
session keys by asking O6. We say the session key is fresh if
and only if the O6 query has not been asked w.r.t. this session.
In other words, the fresh session key must be unknown to the
adversary. For simplicity, we call the test query as O7, which
is a game deﬁned as follows:
• O7 — Test(
∏
, i): In protocol
∏
, if
∏i
U,P and
∏i
P,U
accept and share the same fresh session key in session
i, upon receiving this query, by tossing a coin b the
correct session key is returned if b = 0, otherwise, a
random session key is returend. A only can ask this
query one time and A needs to output one bit b′ as
the result of guessing b. A’s advantage in attacking the
session key security (SKS) of protocol
∏
is deﬁned as
AdvSKS∏ (AO
′
)=|2Pr[b′ = b]−1|, where O′ = O∪{O7}.
Session key security [17] models adversary A’s inability
to distinguish the real session key and a random string, as
formally deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 5. (Session Key Security) We say an AKESSO
satisﬁes session key security if for any PPT adversary A,
AdvSKS∏ (AO
′
) ≤ , where O′ = O ∪ {O7}.
Finally, we can give the deﬁnition of secure authenticated
key exchange single sign-on scheme.
Deﬁnition 6. (Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Single
Sign-On Scheme): An AKESSO scheme is called secure if
it is correct and satisﬁes SCUA, SSPA, and session key
security.
III. REVIEW OF CHANG-LEE’S SCHEME
In 2012, Chang and Lee [12] proposed an improved efﬁcient
remote user identiﬁcation scheme for mobile device users, the
scheme employs single sign-on technique, supports session
key establishment, and preserves user anonymity. However,
the scheme neither provides credential privacy nor soundness
due to [6]. In this section, We brieﬂy reviews the Chang-Lee
scheme and its drawbacks.
A. Review of the Scheme
Chang-Lee’s SSO scheme consists of three phases: system
initialization, registration, and user identiﬁcation. The details
are as follows.
1) System Initialization Phase: The trusted authority TCP
determines the RSA key pair (e, d) and a generator g, and
publishes public parameters.
2) Registration Phase: In this phase, the trusted authority
signs an RSA signature Si = (IDi||h(IDi))d mod N to user
Ui as the credential. For each service provider Pj , he needs to
maintain his own RSA public parameters (IDj , ej , Nj) and
private parameter dj similar as TCP .
3) User Identiﬁcation Phase: In this phase, the session
key is Kij = h(IDi||kij), where kij is the plain Difﬁe-
Hellman session key. For identifying service providers, an
RSA signature scheme has been used; for user authentica-
tion, the user need to provide a proof z = Sh(Kij ||k2||n2)i
mod N of credential Si, where k2 is user’s session key
material and n2 is a random nonce selected by the user. For
the purpose of anonymity, the random nonce n3 and user
identity which used for proof checking has been encrypted
via symmetric key encryption scheme with session key Kij
(treated as encryption key). The user can pass authentication
if ze mod N = SIDh(Kij ||k2||n2)i mod N dose hold, and
the user believes that they are share the same session key if
the hashed n3 has been received.
B. Review of Attacks
Two high risky attacks are identiﬁed in [6] on Chang-
Lee scheme. The former allows a malicious Pj to recover
user credential; the latter enables an adversary passing user
authentication without a valid credential. They are brieﬂy
reviewed below.
1) Credential Recovering Attack: A user Ui can pass
authentication if he provides the valid proof z of knowl-
edge Ci. To simplify the discussion, we use h2 to denote
h(Kij ||k2||n2). So proof z = Sh2i . It is easy to see that for
different proofs in different session, the same credential Si
has been encrypted multiple times with different h2 but the
same modulo N . Thus, if a malicious Pj has been accessed
twice with the same user Ui, then Pj is able to recover Ui’s
credential Si by using extended Euclidean algorithm. Let us
suppose that (z′, z′′) and (h′2, h
′′
2), the proofs and hash values
in two different sessions, satisfy gcd(h′2, h
′′
2) = 1. Then we
can ﬁnd two integers a and b such that a · h′2 + b · h′′2 = 1
(in Z) due to the extended Euclidean algorithm. Finally,
the Pj can recover user credential by computing z′a · z′′b
mod N = S
h′2·a+h′′2 ·b
i mod N = Si. The success rate of
this attack is about 60% [6].
2) Impersonation Attack without Credentials: A small RSA
public key e has been assumed in this attack, where the “small”
requires the binary length of e is much less than the output
length of hash function h. The rationality of this assumption
is given in [6]. In the conversation, if the h2 is divisible by
e, then the adversary computes an integer b such that h2 =
e · b, and calculates proof z by z = SIDbi , where SIDi =
IDi||h(IDi). The veriﬁcation holds as SIDh2i mod N =
SIDb·ei mod N = z
e mod N . Thus, the adversary can pass
user authentication without a valid credential. The success rate
of the attack is about 1/e [6].
IV. REVIEW OF SCHNORR SIGNATURE
As one of the simplest, shortest, and frequently used signa-
ture schemes, Schnorr signature scheme [18], [13] is provably
secure in a random oracle model under the assumption that
discrete logarithm problem is intractable [19], [20], [21], [15].
We now review Schnorr signature scheme as follows.
Initialisation: The scheme is deﬁned in a cyclic group G
of order q with a generator g ∈ Z∗p, were p and q are primes
such that q|p − 1, q ≥ 2160, and p ≥ 21024. A secure hash
function h(·) is also selected.
Signature Generation: To sign a message m with private
key x ∈ Z∗q , a signer picks a randomness r ∈ Z∗q , and
outputs the signature (a, e, s) by computing a = gr mod p,
e = h(a,m), and s = r + x · e mod q.
Signature Veriﬁcation: Given a signature (a, e, s) for mes-
sage m w.r.t. public key y = gx mod p, the veriﬁer accepts
this signature iff e ≡ h(a,m) and gs ≡ aye mod p.
Let us denote Init(λ), SGen(·) and SV er(·) the initialisa-
tion algorithm, signing algorithm and veriﬁcation algorithm,
respectively. Formally, a signature scheme is called existen-
tially unforgeable if for any PPT forgery algorithm A, it can
only win the following game, called Game-UFCMA, with a
negligible probability [22][23].
• Setup: (pk, sk) ← Init(λ). Given a security parameter
λ, a public/private key pair is generated by the initialisa-
tion algorithm and adversary A is given the public key
pk.
• Query: σi ← SGen(sk,mi). A runs up to q times to
ask the signature signing oracle in an adaptive manner.
Each time, the signing oracle will reply a signature σi
for each message mi chosen by A, where 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
• Forge: A outputs a new message and signature pair
(mj , σj). A wins if
1) SV er(pk,mj , σj) = 1, i.e., σj is a valid signature
for message mj under the public key pk.
2) mj 	= mi, for any i ∈ {1, · · · , q}.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents a secure single sign-on scheme with
user anonymity for remote user authentication in distributed
systems and networks. We use Schnorr signature [18][13] to
overcome the drawbacks in Chang-Lee scheme as their user
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED IN THE SCHEME
TCP The trusted credential provider
Pj A service provider
Ui A user
SIDj The unique identity of Pj
IDi The unique identity of Ui
Ci The credential of Ui
x The long term private key of TCP
y The public key of TCP
Ek(M) Symmetric encryption of message M using key k
Dk(C) Symmetric decryption of ciphertext C using key k
h(·) A secure hash function
proof cannot provide soundness and credential privacy while
Schnorr signature can. As a proveably unforgeable signature
scheme [21], Schnorr signature allows a signer to authenticate
him/herself by signing a message without releasing any other
useful information about his/her private signing key. In the
proposed scheme, the TCP ﬁrst issues the credential for each
user by signing the user’s identity IDi according to Schnorr
signature. Then, by treating his/her credential as another
public/private key pair the user can authenticate him/herself by
signing a Schnorr signature on a temporal message generated
in the protocol. In contrast, each service provider maintains
its own public/private key pair in any secure signature scheme
so that it can authenticate itself to users by simply issuing a
normal signature. Finally, as does in Chang-Lee scheme [12],
the session key is established by running a variant of Difﬁe-
Hellman key exchange protocol, and the user anonymity is
guaranteed by symmetric key encryption. The notations used
in the scheme are summarised in Table I.
System Setup Phase: In this phase, TCP initializes his/her
public and private parameters as Schnorr signature scheme.
Firstly, TCP picks large primes p and q such that q|p − 1,
chooses a generator g of large safe prime order q in cyclic
group G. Then, TCP sets its private key SK = x, where
x ∈ Z∗q is a random number, and publishes its public key
PK = y, where y = gx mod p.
Registration Phase: In this phase, user asks TCP for
registration, then TCP issues a unique identity IDi via
IdGen(RIi) and signs a Schnorr signature (a, e, C) for user’s
identity as credential generation algorithm CGen(IDi, SK).
C is kept secret by user, while (a, e) will be made public. The
details are given below.
• User Registration: When a user Ui asks for registration,
TCP selects a unique identity IDi and generates a cre-
dential Ci = (a, e, C) for Ui by selecting a randomness
r ∈ Z∗q and computing a = gr mod p, e = h(a, IDi),
and C = r+xe mod q. Then, TCP sends identity IDi
and credential Ci which is Schnorr signature for IDi to
user Ui, where C should be kept as a secret.
• Service Provider Registration: Each Pj maintains a pub-
lic/private key pair (PKj , SKj) of any secure signature
scheme. Here, algorithms SPPGen(·) and SPPV er(·)
are identical to the signature generation and veriﬁcation
algorithms respectively.
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Fig. 1. Participant Identiﬁcation Phase
Authentication Phase: In this phase, to authenticate
him/herself user Ui signs a Schnorr signature the newly
established session key Kij using credential C the signing key,
while Ui’s session key material k2 is used as the commitment.
Note that the corresponding veriﬁcation key of C is gC , which
can be recovered by computing gC = a · ye mod p. For
service provider authentication, any provably secure signature
scheme can be used to authenticate a service provider in
proposed scheme. The session key is established by using
modiﬁed Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange scheme which has
been formally proved in [12], and the user anonymity and
unlinkability are preserved by using symmetric key encryption
to encrypt a, e, and user’s identity IDi. The details of this
phase are illustrated in Figure 1 and further explained below.
1) User Ui chooses a random nonce n1 and sends M1 =
(Req, n1) to Pj , where Req is a service request.
2) Upon receiving (Req, n1), Pj picks random number
r1 ∈ Z∗q , computes its session key material k1 = gr1
mod p, u = h(k1||SIDj ||n1) and signs u to get a
signature v = SPPGen(SKj , u), and sends M2 =
(k1, v, n2) to the user.
3) User Ui ﬁrst computes u = h(k1||SIDj ||n1)
and veriﬁes the signature v by checking if
SPPV er(PKj , u, v) = 1. If the output is “0”,
Ui terminates the protocol. Otherwise, Ui accepts
the service provider Pj’s authentication, and then
selects a random number r2 ∈ Z∗q to compute
k2 = g
r2 mod p, kij = kr21 mod p, and the
session key Kij = h(SIDj ||kij). After that, Ui
signs Kij using his/her credential secret C by
calculating ei = h(k2,Kij), z = r2 + Cei mod q
and ω = EK(IDi||n3||n2||e||a), where n3 is a nonce
chosen by Ui. Finally, Ui sends M3 = (ω, z, k2) to
service provider Pj .
4) To verify z, Pj ﬁrst calculates kij = kr12 mod p,
derives session key Kij = h(SIDj ||kij) and decrypt ω
with Kij to recover IDi||n3||n2||e||a. Then, Pj checks
if e = h(a||IDi). If this does not hold, Pj aborts
the protocol. Otherwise, the service provider computes
ei = h(k2,Kij) and veriﬁes z by checking if gz =
k2 · aei · (ye)ei mod p. If this holds, Pj accepts Ui’s
authentication, believes that they have shared the same
session key Kij , and sends V = h(n3) as M4 to Ui.
5) User Ui computes V ′ = h(n3) and checks if V ′ = V . If
this holds, Ui believes that he/she has shared the same
session key Kij with Pj .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed scheme employs Schnorr signature scheme
[18][13] to generate credentials for users, uses modiﬁed Difﬁe-
Hellman key exchange scheme to establish the session key,
signs a Schnorr signature on the hashed session key for
user authentication, uses any secure signature scheme for
server authentication, and takes symmetric key encryption to
ensure user anonymity. The secure authenticated key exchange
single sign-on (AKESSO) scheme requires secure credential
based user authentication (SCUA), secure service provider
authentication (SSPA), and secure session key. To prove the
security of proposed AKESSO, we will just prove SCUA and
SSPA because (1) the proposed scheme only improves parts
of key generation, user authentication and service provider
authentication in Chang-Lee scheme [12], while the parts of
user anonymity and session key establishment have not been
modiﬁed; and the user anonymity and session key security
have been proved in [12] and discussed in [6] without revealing
any problems. Now, we start to formally analyse the security
of the proposed AKESSO scheme.
Theorem 1. (Correctness) The proposed construction is a
correct AKESSO scheme according to Deﬁnition 2.
Proof: This can be straightforwardly veriﬁed according
to Deﬁnition 2 given in Section II.
Informally, the proposed AKESSO scheme guarantees
SSPA as each service provider employs a secure signature
scheme. To prove SCUA, we need to show that Deﬁnition
3 holds for the proposed AKESSO scheme by assuming the
unforgeability of Schnorr signature scheme.
Theorem 2. (Secure Credential based User Authentication) In
proposed AKESSO scheme, if there is an PPT adversary A who
has a non-negligible advantage AdvSCUA(AO) as speciﬁed
in Deﬁnition 3, then Schnorr signature scheme is existentially
forgeable under UFCMA attacks as deﬁned in Section IV.
Proof: As adversary A, with access to all oracles
in O = {O1, · · · ,O6}, has a non-negligible advantage
AdvSCUA(AO), according to Deﬁnition 3 this implies that
at least one of the following two cases is true:
• Case (1): With a non-negligible probability 1, AO
is able to derive a credential Ct corresponding to an
unregistered target identity IDt.
• Case (2): With a non-negligible probability 2, AO is
able to forge a valid user proof for a new message M
w.r.t. a registered target identity IDi.
Now, we will prove that if either Case (1) or Case (2) is
true, we can construct an algorithm B that is able to break
the unforgeability of Schnorr signature, where B runs AO as
a sub-program for fulﬁlling its purpose.
Case (1). Suppose that B is given a target Schnorr signature
scheme with parameter (p, q, h(·)) and public key y = gx
mod p, where the private key x is not known to B. B’s
strategy for wining Game-UFCMA with non-negligible prob-
ability is to set up an AKESSO scheme for A and to simulate
oracles in O such that A cannot distinguish the difference
between this simulated environment and a real AKESSO
scheme. Therefore, A will be able to successfully derive a
credential Ct for an unregistered identity IDt with probability
1. After that, B can adapt this credential into a forged Schnorr
signature for a new message and thus break the unforgeability
of Schnorr signature scheme.
Now we describe how B sets up such a simulated AKESSO
scheme for A. First, B sets y as the public key of TCP and
gives y to B. Then, each oracle in Oi (i = 1, · · · , 6) can
be simulated as follows. To simulate O1 query B can ask its
own signing oracle to get a Schnorr signature Ci for each
identity IDi and then reply (IDi, Ci) to A. To simulate O2
query B can simply run Init(λ1) to get a public/private key
pair (SKj , PKj) for an identity SIDj , and then forwards
(SIDj , SKj , PKj) to A. As B knows all users’ credentials
and all service providers’s private keys, it can simulate oracles
O3, O4, O5 and O6 by trivially executing the whole protocol∏
, running one move on behalf of a user, running one move
on behalf of a service provider, and revealing a session,
respectively. Note that as IDt is an unregistered identity in
this case, the corresponding user Ut will not be involved in
any oracle Oi (i = 1, · · · , 6).
It is not difﬁcult to see that the above simulated system
is indistinguishable from a real system in the view point of
A. Hence, A will be able to output a credential Ct for target
identity IDt with non-negligible probability 1, where IDt is
not asked in O1 queries. Therefore, B will simply forward Ct
as a forged Schnorr signature for message IDt. Since IDt is
not asked in O1 queries, A does not ask IDt in its signing
oracle, i.e., IDt is a new message for B. So, B’s forged
message-signature pair (IDt, Ct) is valid according to the
deﬁnition of Game-UFCMA (refer to Section IV). Moreover,
B’s success rate is exactly the same as A’s, i.e., 1, which is
non-negligible. Consequently, this means that B successfully
breaks the unforgeablity of Schnorr signature scheme.
Case (2). This can be proved similarly as Case (1) but B
will embed its target Schnorr signature scheme in the user
proof generation algorithm for a registered target user Ut with
identity IDt. Details are given as follows.
Suppose that B is given a target Schnorr signature scheme
with parameter (p, q, h(·)) and public key y′ = gx′ mod p,
where the private key x′ is not known to B. First, B sets y =
gx mod p as the public key of TCP by selecting a random
number x as TCP ’s private key. For any identity IDi except
target identity IDt, to answer anO1 query B can directly issue
a credential Ci for IDi by generating a Schnorr signature for
IDi as B knows TCP ’s private key x. In contrast, B will
take (a′, e′, x′) as the credential Ct for target identity IDt,
where e′ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1} is a random number, a′ ∈ Z∗p
is set as a′ = y′ · y−e′ mod p, and h(a′, IDt) is set as e′.
So, we have gx
′
= a′yh(e
′,IDt) mod p. Note that B does not
know the value of x′ and it will be not required to reveal Ct to
A because IDt is the target identity. In addition, here we can
artiﬁcially ﬁx the hash value for such a special input (a′, IDt)
because Schnorr signature is secure in random oracle where
hash function can be viewed as an random function [21]. All
other oracles in O can be simulated as in Case (1), except
A asks O3 and O4 queries in which Ut with identity IDt
is involved. In such scenarios, B can simulate Ut to output
a valid user proof upt w.r.t. credential Ct by executing the
whole protocol
∏
or running one move with necessary help
from its own signing oracle w.r.t. public key y′.
Again, it is not difﬁcult to see that the above simulated
system is indistinguishable from a real system in the view
point of A. Hence, with probability 2 A will be able to output
a valid user proof upt for a message M w.r.t. target identity
IDt, where M is not asked in O3 and O4 queries. Therefore,
B can simply forward upt as a forged Schnorr signature for
message M . Since M is not asked in O3 and O4 queries, A
does not ask M in its signing oracle, i.e., M is a new message
for B. So, B’s forged message-signature pair (upt,M) is valid
according to the deﬁnition of Game-UFCMA (refer to Section
IV). Moreover, B’s success rate is exactly the same as A’s,
i.e., 2, which is non-negligible. Consequently, this means that
B successfully breaks the unforgeablity of Schnorr signature
scheme.
Remark 5. In Case (1), AO could directly forge Ct, recover
Ct after executing protocol
∏
with user Ut or eavesdropping
the transcripts between Ut and some service providers, or
derive Ct in any other possible way, though AO is not allowed
to obtain Ct by trivially asking O1 oracle w.r.t. IDt. Hence,
this means that if our AKESSO fails to satisfy the unforgeablity
or unrecoverableness of credential, then Schnorr signature
is forgeable. Similarly, in Case (2) AO could directly forge
a user proof upt without credential Ct, observe and adapts
existing user proofs generated by Ut into a user proof upt for
a message M , or compute upt in any other way, though AO
is not allowed to obtain any user proof for the same message
M by trivially asking O3 and O4 oracles w.r.t. IDt. Hence,
this implies that if our AKESSO fails to satisfy soundness of
credential based authentication [6], then Schnorr signature is
forgeable.
As Schnorr signature scheme is proved to be secure under
the discrete logarithm assumption [21], Theorem 2 assures
that the proposed AKESSO scheme achieves secure creden-
tial based user authentication under the discrete logarithm
assumption.
Theorem 3. (Secure Service Provider Authentication) In pro-
posed AKESSO, if there is an PPT adversary A who has
a non-negligible advantage AdvSSPA(AO) as speciﬁed in
Deﬁnition 4, then signature signature scheme employed by
service providers is existentially forgeable under UFCMA
attacks as deﬁned in Section IV.
Proof: Since a service provider proof is directly generated
as a normal signature by the corresponding service provider,
Theorem 3 can be formally proved as we did for Case (2) in
Theorem 1. Note that here we do not need to discuss Case (1)
as in Theorem 1, because each service provider is required to
register its public/private key pair. Due to space limit, the full
proof is omitted.
Theorem 4. According to Deﬁnition 6, the proposed AKESSO
scheme is secure under the assumption that all digital sig-
natures employed in the scheme are existentially unforgeable
against UFCMA attacks as speciﬁed in Section IV.
Proof: By Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and session
key security proved in [12], Theorem 4 holds according to
Deﬁnition 6.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Most existing single sign-on schemes suffer from various
security issues and are vulnerable to different attacks. In
this paper, we ﬁrst formalized authenticated key exchange
single sign-on scheme. Specially, we formally deﬁned secure
authentication for both users and service providers as such a
treatment has not been studied yet [6]. Moreover, a Schnorr
mechanism based SSO scheme has been proposed to overcome
the drawbacks of Chang-Lee scheme [12] but keep the same
advantages. In this new scheme, to preserve credential gener-
ation privacy, the TCP signs a Schnorr signature [18][13] on
user identity; and to protect credential privacy and soundness,
the user exploits his/her credential as a signing key to sign a
Schnorr signature on the hashed session key. In fact, Schnorr
signature mechanism [18][13] is more efﬁcient than RSA
mechanism which has been employed by Chang-Lee scheme.
Thus, the proposed scheme reduces the computation cost,
enhances the conﬁdentiality, and preserves soundness and
credential privacy.
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